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Presentation Title: When Failure Means Success: Accepting Risk in Aerospace Development 
 
Synopsis: 
Failure is an option during testing, providing valuable lessons that actually lead to mission success. This 
presentation will use flight demonstration testing failures as the basis for discussing when to accept 
higher risk levels in non-human-rated vehicles, such as the upcoming Ares I-X mission. 
 
Abstract: 
Over the last three decades, NASA has been diligent in qualifying systems for human space flight. As the 
Agency transitions from operating the Space Shuttle, its employees must learn to accept higher risk levels 
to generate the data needed to certify its next human space flight system. The Marshall Center’s 
Engineering workforce is developing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and designing the Ares V cargo 
launch vehicle for safety, reliability, and cost-effective operations. This presentation will provide a risk 
retrospective, using first-hand examples from the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DC-XA) and the 
X-33 single-stage-to-orbit flight demonstrators, while looking ahead to the upcoming Ares I-X uncrewed 
test flight. The DC-XA was successfully flown twice in 26 hours, setting a new turnaround-time record. 
Later, one of its 3 landing gears did not deploy, it tipped over, and was destroyed. During structural 
testing, the X-33’s advanced composite tanks were unable to withstand the forces to which it was 
subjected and the project was later cancelled. These are examples of successful failures, as the data 
generated are captured in databases used by vehicle designers today. More recently, the Ares I-X flight 
readiness review process was streamlined in keeping with the mission’s objectives, since human lives are 
not at stake, which reflects the beginning of a cultural change. Failures are acceptable during testing, as 
they provide the lessons that actually lead to mission success. These and other examples will stimulate 
the discussion of when to accept risk in aerospace projects. 
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Evolving from Saturn, to Shuttle, to Ares 
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Space Shuttle  
Operations through 2010 
14 
Ares V Rocket 
First Flight in 2020 
Ares I-X Test 
 Flight 2009 
Expedition to Mars 
Ares I Rocket & V Rocket Development 
Partnerships with Emerging Commercial Space Sector  
Altair Lunar Lander Development 
Carry out Science Missions to Learn about our Planet, Solar System and Universe  
Advance U.S. Technological Leadership in Aeronautics through Research  
Provide Critical Capabilities to Support NASA's Missions  
Expanding Frontiers for 50 Years and Counting 
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Harnessing Risk Management  
Techniques and Tools 
Likelihood Plus Consequence Equals Risk Level 
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Applying Human Space Flight Testing Philosophy 
Considering the Crew Drives Levels of Analyses 
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Learning Lessons from the 1990s:  
Delta-Clipper Experimental Advanced Demonstrator 
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Defining Hardware Limits through 
Technology Development Flight Testing 
Learning Lessons from the 1990s:  
X-33 Single-Stage-to-Orbit Flight Demonstrator 
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Pushing the Limits of Technology 
Transitioning from Shuttle to Ares:  
Hard-Won Lessons 
1/15/09 5-397081  9 
Applying 30 Years of Lessons Lived 
“The great liability of the engineer compared to men of 
other professions is that his works are out in the open 
where all can see them. His acts, step by step, are in 
hard substance. He cannot bury his mistakes in the 
grave like the doctors. He cannot argue them into thin  
air or blame the judge like the lawyers. He cannot, like 
the architects, cover his failures with trees and vines.  
He cannot, like the politicians, screen his short-comings 
by blaming his opponents and hope the people will 
forget. The engineer simply cannot deny he did it. If his 
works do not work, he is damned.” 
                                                   — Herbert Hoover 
U.S. Mining Engineer & Politician (1874 – 1964) 
Reducing Shuttle Risk:  
HD Cameras Visualize ET Foam Loss 
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Regularly Scrubbing Requirements to Reflect Reality 
Reducing Shuttle Risk:  
Low-level Main Engine Cutoff (ECO) Sensor 
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Solving Potentially Critical Anomalies 
Reducing Technical Risk for 
Ares I Crew and Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicles 
In House Upper Stage Design  
and Vehicle Stack Integration 
Designing for Life-Cycle Considerations: 
Safety, Reliability, Affordability 
5-397081  12 1/15/09 
13 
Systems Engineering Throughout  
the Project Lifecycle 
Testing Philosophy Drives Failures 
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Testing for Knowledge Versus  
Testing for Success 
Technology Readiness Levels Drive Testing Objectives 
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Ares I Project Milestones 
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Validates Modeling and Simulation, and Tests Operations Concepts 
Ares I-X Development Flight Test:  
Breaking the Systems Engineering Model 
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Generating & Analyzing Data to Reduce Risk: Main 
Propulsion Test & Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Test 
Testing the Edges and Margins on the Ground 
Verifies Design Performance & Validates Computer Models 
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Project Lifecycle Management Model:  
Reducing Undefined, but Known, Risks 
Designing with the End in Mind 
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Conclusion: Reducing the Risk Inherent 
in the Human Exploration of Space 
 Engineering is a great profession. There is  
the satisfaction of watching a figment of the 
imagination emerge through the aid of science  
to a plan on paper. Then it moves to realization  
in stone or metal or energy. Then it brings homes 
to men or women. Then it elevates the standard  
of living and adds to the comforts of life. This is  
the engineer's high privilege. 
                                                   — Herbert Hoover 
U.S. Mining Engineer & Politician (1874 – 1964) 
One Good Failure Is Worth a Thousand Successes 
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